The detection of fraud activities on the stock market through forward analysis methodology of financial discussion boards by Lee, Pei et al.
Lee, Pei and Owda, M and Crockett, K (2018)The detection of fraud activities
on the stock market through forward analysis methodology of financial dis-
cussion boards. In: Future of Information and Communication Conference
(FICC) 2018, 05 April 2018 - 06 April 2018, Singapore.
Downloaded from: http://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/619559/
Version: Accepted Version
Publisher: Springer
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03405-4_14
Please cite the published version
https://e-space.mmu.ac.uk
 1 | P a g e  
 
The detection of fraud activities on the stock market 
through forward analysis methodology of financial 
discussion boards 
Ms. Pei Shyuan Lee 
School of Computing, Mathematics & Digital Technology 
 The Manchester Metropolitan University, Chester Street,  
Manchester, M1 5GD, UK 
Email: Pei-Shyuan.Lee@mmu.ac.uk 
Dr. Majdi Owda 
School of Computing, Mathematics & Digital Technology 
The Manchester Metropolitan University, Chester Street, 
Manchester, M1 5GD, UK 
Email: M.Owda@mmu.ac.uk 
Dr. Keeley Crockett 
School of Computing, Mathematics & Digital Technology 
The Manchester Metropolitan University, Chester Street, 
Manchester, M1 5GD, UK 
Email: K.Crockett@mmu.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract— Financial discussion boards (FDBs) have been 
widely used for a variety of financial knowledge exchange 
activities through the posting of comments on the FDBs. Popular 
public FDBs are prone to be used as a medium to spread false 
financial information due to having a larger group of audiences. 
Although online forums, in general, are usually integrated with 
anti-spam tools such as Akismet, moderation of posted contents 
heavily relies on human moderators. Unfortunately, popular 
FDBs attract many comments per day which realistically prevents 
human moderators from continuously monitoring and moderating 
possibly fraudulent contents. Such manual moderation can be 
extremely time-consuming. Moreover, due to the absence of useful 
tools, no relevant authorities are actively monitoring and handling 
potential financial crimes on FDBs. This paper presents a novel 
forward analysis methodology implemented in an Information 
Extraction (IE) prototype system named FDBs Miner (FDBM). 
This methodology aims to detect potentially illegal comments on 
FDBs while integrating share prices in the detection process as this 
helps to categorise the potentially illegal comments into different 
risk levels for investigation priority. The IE prototype system will 
first extract the public comments and per minute share prices 
from FDBs for the selected listed companies on London Stock 
Exchange (LSE). In the forward analysis process, the comments 
are flagged using a predefined Pump and Dump financial crime 
related keyword template. By only flagging the comments against 
the keyword template yields an average of 9.82% potentially 
illegal comments. It is unrealistic and unaffordable for human 
moderators to read these comments on a daily basis in long run. 
Hence, by integrating the share prices’ hikes and falls to categorise 
the flagged comments based on risk levels, it saves time and allows 
relevant authorities to prioritise and investigate into the higher 
risk flagged comments as it can potentially indicate real Pump and 
Dump crimes on FDBs. 
Keywords— Financial Discussion Boards; Fraud Detection; 
Crime Prevention; Financial Crimes; Pump and Dump; Text 
Mining; Information Extraction 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Given the freedom of speech on the Internet, there are many 
online forums where like-minded people can hold conversations 
in the form of posted messages. Financial Discussion Boards 
(FDBs) allow investors to exchange knowledge, information, 
experience and opinions about the investment opportunities. 
There is a various popular share price based FDBs in the UK 
which specifically allows investors to discuss share prices. 
These FDBs include the London South East [1], Interactive 
Investor [2] and ADVFN [3]. 
Although online forums seem to be a useful source of 
information, not all information shared on the forums is accurate 
or truthful. Anti-spam plugins such as Akismet [4] are usually 
the default tools integrated on most online forums to filter and 
prevent spammers from registering or posting spam messages. 
However, such tool does not moderate the meaning of a content. 
Similarly, a forum moderator handles only the offensive and/or 
prohibited contents such as racism, sexism, hatred, foul 
languages, third party advertisements and so on. There are very 
little to no measures taken by forum moderators and external 
authorities to monitor and detect potential crimes on the FDBs, 
such as comments indicative of Pump and Dump (P&D). Such 
manual moderation on FDBs requires an enormous amount of 
time and effort, which is not feasible in long run. 
 P&D can happen if an organised group of false investors 
decided to attack shares by buying and selling a specific share in 
a scheduled time frame and giving the market false statements 
about the share throughout the process. Textual comments such 
as “This is the right time let’s start pumping this share” can 
reveal a hidden potential illegal activity of P&D on these FDBs. 
Research from recent years highlighted that the comments on 
FDBs were found manipulative and positively related to the 
market returns, volatility and trading volumes [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. 
However, there is very little attempt [10, 11] made to build tools 
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for monitoring and detection of potential financial crimes on 
share price based FDBs. 
 FDBs contain semantically understandable artefacts (i.e. 
FDBs’ artefacts that can be processed by computers) such as 
stock ticker names, date, time, prices, comment author 
usernames and comments. Information Extraction (IE) 
techniques are used in this research to extract these artefact data. 
IE is defined as the process of extracting information 
automatically into a structured data format from an unstructured 
or semi-structured data sources [12]. IE has been used in other 
areas such as accounting [13] and search engine [14]. However, 
other than the initial work described in [11] and [15], there is 
very little usage of IE techniques in FDBs’ financial crimes 
related research. 
During the detection of potentially illegal comments in [15], 
share prices were not considered. Hence, the novel methodology 
introduced in this paper will be used to flag all the potentially 
illegal comments while integrating the share prices into the 
detection process. This methodology is implemented in an IE 
prototype system named FDBs Miner (FDBM). FDBM will start 
by analysing all the comments against a predefined P&D IE 
keyword template. Then, it matches and appends the price figure 
to the flagged comments which share the same or closest date 
and time based on same ticker symbol. Subsequently, the 
forward analyser takes each flagged comment’s price as a “base 
price”, and calculate ± 2 days’ worth of prices to check if there 
is any price hike of 5%, 10% and 15% compared to the “base 
price”. Finally, it appends the price hike threshold labels to these 
flagged comments. The main contribution of this paper is to 
introduce a novel methodology that will flag potentially illegal 
comments as well as categorise these comments based on the 
level of risks. This can greatly benefit the relevant authorities to 
prioritise and investigate into the potentially illegal comments 
according to risk levels. 
Section II reviews the examples of past financial crimes on 
share price based FDBs. Section III introduces Information 
Extraction (IE) and its usage in FDBM. Section IV presents an 
architecture overview of FDBM. This followed by Section V 
which describes the novel forward analysis methodology and the 
experimental results in Section VI. Lastly, Section VII 
concludes the research findings. 
II. PUMP AND DUMP (P&D) CRIMES ON FDBS 
P&D crimes are normally committed through various 
mediums such as discussion boards, word of mouth, social 
media, emails and so on. The following are a few examples of 
the popular share price based P&D financial crimes: 
• 15-year-old Jonathan Lebed was the first minor 
involved in a stock market fraud in 2000 [16]. Lebed 
earned a total revenue of US$800,000 by pumping the 
share price through Yahoo! Finance Message Board 
over half a year and charged by Security Exchange 
Commission (SEC) [16, 17, 18]. 
• In 2000, two were being charged for pumping the price 
of a share by 10,000% by posting on Raging Bull 
message board and then dumped millions of shares 
which the profit made was at least US$5 million [17]. 
• In 2009, eight participants were charged by Security 
Exchange Commission (SEC) for being involved in 
penny stock manipulation [19]. These criminals met 
each other through InvestorsHub (now owned by 
ADVFN [3]), a popular penny stock message board, 
and carried out the P&D scheme throughout the year of 
2006 and 2007. 
Based on the above FDBs related P&D crimes, there is a 
clear and persistent need to create methods and tools to detect 
potentially illegal contents on share price based FDBs in real 
time. 
III. INFORMATION EXTRACTION (IE) 
IE is the process of extracting information such as text from 
unstructured or semi-structured data sources into a structured 
data format [12]. Soderland [20] suggested that there is a need 
for systems that extract information automatically from text 
data. IE systems are knowledge-intensive [20] as these systems 
extract only snippets of information that will fit predefined 
templates (fixed format) which represent useful and relevant 
information about the domain then display to end users of a 
system [21]. 
IE is used in this research to automatically extract 
information from an unstructured or semi-structured data source 
(such as FDB comments and share prices) into a structured data 
format (i.e. FDBs dataset). The IE prototype system in this 
research can display a summary of information from several 
interlinked sources (i.e. FDB comments and share prices) 
allowing filtering of potentially illegal comments to take place. 
IV. AN ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW OF FDBS MINER 
(FDBM) 
This section presents the FDBM architecture which consists 
of five key components. These key components are the data 
crawler, data transformer, FDB dataset (FDB-DS), IE keyword 
template and the forward analyser. In general, FDBM will first 
collect data, then transform unstructured and semi-structured 
data into fully structured data which kept in the FDB-DS. The 
IE keyword template is for the use with the forward analyser. 
The novel methodology introduced in this paper is made 
functional in the forward analyser component. 
 
Figure 1 provides an architecture overview of the FDBM 
prototype system.  Each component in the architecture diagram 
is described in the following sections. 
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           Fig. 1.   Architecture Overview Diagram. 
A. Data Crawler 
The data crawler is responsible for automatically collecting 
unstructured data from the three FDBs (i.e. LSE [1], III [2] and 
ADVFN [3]) at different time intervals for 12 weeks (23rd 
September 2014 to 22nd December 2014). A total of 941 ticker 
symbols (i.e. unique abbreviations of companies listed on the 
stock market), 507,970 FDB comments and 28,980,465 price 
figures were collected. 
B. Data Transformer 
Once the data collection is done by the data crawler, the data 
transformer extracts and converts the collected unstructured 
data in various formats such as HTML, CSV and XML into 
structured data. 
C. FDB Dataset (FDB-DS) 
After the collected data is being processed by data 
transformer, the structured data such as price figures, 
comments, comment author usernames, date and time of 
comments and prices are stored in the FDB-DS accordingly. 
The FDB-DS is also responsible to store additional data 
produced from research analysis. 
D. IE Keyword Template 
The Pump and Dump IE keyword template has been created 
and saved locally in the prototype system in a text (TXT) file 
format. It can be easily modified whenever needed. The IE 
keyword template consists of a series of keywords and phrases  
 
 
that were thoroughly researched [22, 23, 24, 25] and has been 
validated by experts in the relevant field. The IE keyword 
template will be used by the forward analyser for the comments 
flagging process. 
E. Forward Analyser 
The forward analyser matches the Pump and Dump IE 
keyword template against the comments in order to flag 
potentially illegal FDB comments. Followed by matching the 
prices to the flagged comments, calculating and labelling price 
thresholds. The novel methodology used in this component will 
be further discussed in Section V. 
V. FORWARD ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
This section introduces the novel forward analysis 
methodology. This methodology flags and filters the potentially 
illegal P&D comments using P&D keyword template. It also 
integrates the share prices in the analysis process in order to 
categorise the flagged comments into different risk levels. This 
allows relevant authorities to investigate into the flagged 
comments more realistically in terms of time and efforts. 
As shown in the architecture diagram above (Fig. 1), the 
forward analyser component contains several functions (i.e. 
comments flagging, price matching and threshold labelling) that 
are part of the forward analysis methodology and will be 
discussed below. 
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A. Comments Flagging 
 Firstly, the forward analyser matches all the available 
keywords and phrases from the Pump and Dump IE keyword 
template against all the 507,970 comments which were stored in 
FDB dataset (FDB-DS). The flagged comments which deemed 
potentially illegal are imported into FDB-DS as a new database 
table named `flaggedcomment`. 
B. Prices and Comments Flagging 
 Once `flaggedcomment` has been populated, the forward 
analyser appends the price to each flagged comment by 
matching the ticker symbol and the exact or nearest date and 
time. This step is done to ensure a “base price” is set for each 
flagged comment. The “base price” will be used for threshold 
labelling in next step. Due to the extremely large 12 weeks’ 
worth of price data belongs to 941 companies, the process of 
setting a “base price” takes up to a week to complete. 
C. Comments Threshold Labelling 
 After having all the “base price” set for each flagged 
comment in the previous step, the forward analyser labels each 
flagged comment with thresholds. Due to the large data set, the 
threshold labelling process takes up to five days to complete all 
threshold calculations. To determine whether a flagged 
comment’s base price exceeds any thresholds, the forward 
analyser first calculates all the ± 2 days’ per minute prices 
against the “base price” of each flagged comment. 
The threshold labelling rules are listed as follows: 
• Flagged comments that have no price figure (due to 
empty price figures collected from ADVFN) is 
labelled as “N” (Null). 
• If any of the ± 2 days prices calculated against the 
“base price” indicates a 5% price hike the comment 
is labelled as “Y” (Yellow). 
• If any of the ± 2 days prices calculated against the 
“base price” indicates a 10% price hike the comment 
is labelled as “A” (Amber). 
• If any of the ± 2 days prices calculated against the 
“base price” indicates a 15% price hike the comment 
is labelled as “R” (Red). 
• Flagged comments that do not trigger any thresholds 
are labelled as “C”. 
VI. FORWARD ANALYSIS RESULTS 
By matching the keywords and phrases from P&D IE 
keyword template against all the 507,970 comments, a total 
number of 49,858 comments were flagged as potentially illegal 
comments (as shown in Table 1). These flagged comments took 
up 9.82% of the total comments. 
TABLE I.           TOTAL NUMBER OF FLAGGED COMMENTS 
Comments Total Percentage 
Flagged 49,858 9.82% 
Non-flagged 458,112 90.18% 
Grand Total 507,970 100% 
 
Out of all the 49,858 flagged comments, 3,613 (7.25%) of 
the flagged comments triggered the “R” 15% price hike 
threshold, 2,555 (5.12%) flagged comments triggered the “A” 
10% price hike threshold and 5,197 (10.42%) flagged comments 
triggered the “Y” 5% price hike threshold. 37,895 (76.01%) 
flagged comments labelled as “C” did not trigger any price 
thresholds. The total number of flagged comments that triggered 
the thresholds is summarised in Table 2 and visualised in Figure 
2. 
TABLE II.           TOTAL NUMBER OF FLAGGED COMMENTS IN EACH PRICE 
HIKE THRESHOLD 
Threshold Total Percentage 
C (<5%) 37,895 76.01% 
Y (5%) 5,197 10.42% 
A (10%) 2,555 5.12% 
R (15%) 3,613 7.25% 
Null 598 1.2% 
Grand Total 49,858 100% 
 
  Fig. 2. Total number and percentage of each threshold. 
 The time taken in this analysis process is long, however, this 
is only due to the significant amount of data being processed and 
analysed. If the prototype system and methodology are used in 
real time in real world scenario, it can significantly reduce the 
time, effort and cost of monitoring and detecting P&D crimes on 
FDBs. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper has introduced a novel methodology for 
detecting potentially illegal activities on share price based 
FDBs by looking not only at the comments but also the per 
minute share prices. IE techniques were used to collect FDB 
artefacts such as ticker symbol, comments and prices which 
made the forward analysis possible to be conducted in this 
research. A total of 49,858 comments were flagged when 
matching against the P&D IE keyword template. In average, 
this is 4,154 flagged comments per week or 593 flagged 
comments a day. More importantly, these comments belong to 
only 941 listed companies, not the entire stock market in the 
 
37895, 
76.01%
5197, 
10.42%
2555, 
5.12%
3613, 
7.25%
598, 
1.20%
Total number of flagged comments in 
each price hike threshold
C (<5%) Y (5%) A (10%) R (15%) Null
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UK. In order to perform a more realistic investigation into such 
financial crime on all the FDBs and for all listed companies in 
the UK on a daily basis, the forward analysis methodology 
integrates share prices in the analysis process. This makes it 
possible for the relevant authorities to prioritise on investigating 
the flagged comments that have higher risks. The methodology 
implemented in FDBM can significantly reduce the time and 
efforts needed by the relevant authorities to investigate P&D 
crime on FDBs in real time. 
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